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UNCONTAINABLE THREAT: THE NATION’S COAL
ASH PONDS
ABSTRACT
Coal ash ponds pose a significant threat to the environment and human
health. Coal ash is a byproduct of the electricity production process, and it
contains carcinogens like boron, arsenic, lithium, and mercury. Typically, utility
companies store coal ash in ponds located near rivers and lakes. If coal ash is
stored in ponds that lack an adequate liner, the coal ash can seep into the
groundwater and travel to nearby surface waters, which may serve as a drinking
water source for neighboring communities. The EPA has admitted that the
majority of America’s coal ash ponds are unlined and prone to leaks. Moreover,
there have been several instances where coal ash ponds have failed and
discharged millions of gallons of coal ash into surrounding surface waters. In
an effort to protect citizens’ health and the environment, plaintiffs have utilized
the Clean Water Act to hold utilities liable when they discharge coal ash
pollutants to surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric and Power
Co. determined that coal ash ponds were not point sources under the CWA, and
this decision will likely prevent future plaintiffs from bringing claims against
utilities under the Act.
The holding in Sierra Club will also limit future plaintiffs’ ability to hold
polluters liable for unpermitted discharges from other types of “containers,”
which will increase the possibility of an environmental disaster. As a result, the
Supreme Court must step in and reverse the Fourth Circuit’s decision. More
specifically, the Supreme Court must hold that coal ash ponds are point sources
under the CWA. To reach this decision, the Supreme Court must first look to the
purpose of the CWA, which was designed “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Then, the Supreme
Court must look to the language of the Act, specifically the CWA’s definition of
the term “point source.” Lastly, the Supreme Court must look to other cases
involving “containers” as they indicate that “natural processes” may be part of
a point source discharge if the polluter “initially collected” the pollutants.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Circuit has determined that coal ash piles are nonpoint sources
under the Clean Water Act (CWA),1 and this decision poses a significant threat
to the environment and human health. Coal ash piles are constructed by coalfired power plants to store the waste that is generated during the electricity
production process, and they pose a great danger to human health and the
environment as the coal ash contains “carcinogens and a myriad of
neurotoxins.”2 Coal ash piles are usually located in the ground next to power
plants, and when they are unlined, pollutants can leach into the groundwater.3
The contaminants can travel through the groundwater to navigable surface
waters, and as a result, drinking water sources may be contaminated with arsenic
and other pollutants.4 Despite the significant threat posed by coal ash piles, the
Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric and Power Co. reasoned that
a coal ash pile, or any other type of “container,” is not a point source under the
CWA unless the coal ash pile itself served as a “conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters.”5
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club rested upon its analysis of the
CWA.6 Congress passed the CWA in 1972 “to restore and maintain the

1
See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018) (“In this case, the diffuse
seepage of water through the ponds into the soil and groundwater does not make the pond a conveyance any
more than it makes the landfill or soil generally a conveyance.”).
2
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (first citing Hazardous
and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed.
Reg. 21,302, 21,303 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261); and then citing Identification
and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg.
35,128, 35,153, 35,168 (June 21, 2010)) (determining that “[c]oal-fired power plants in the United States …
produced approximately 110 million tons of solid waste” and “that waste contains myriad of carcinogens and
neurotoxins”).
3
See id. at 422–23 (citing Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,343–44)
(discussing legacy ponds which “are ‘generally unlined’ and unmonitored, and so are shown to be more likely
to leak than units at utilities still in operation”).
4
See Va. Elec. & Power Co, 903 F.3d at 406 (“Following a bench trial, the district court found that
rainwater and groundwater were indeed leaching arsenic from the coal ash in the landfill and settling ponds,
polluting the groundwater, which carried the arsenic into navigable waters.”); Tenn. Clean Water Network v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2018) (“After a bench trial, the district court found that TVA
violated the CWA because its coal ash ponds at the Gallatin plant leaks pollutants through groundwater that is
‘hydrologically connected’ to the Cumberland River without a permit.”), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL
1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
5
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412 (“Regardless of whether a source is a pond or some other type
of container, the source must still be functioning as a conveyance of the pollutant into navigable waters to
qualify as a point source.”).
6
Id. at 410.
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”7 Instead of
preserving the standards of liability under the 1948 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and the Water Quality Act of 1965, Congress fashioned the CWA
to deliver a new standard of liability for polluters based on effluent limitations.8
The CWA serves as the primary “legislative source of the [Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA)] authority—and responsibility—to abate and control
water pollution.”9 Additionally, the CWA makes “the discharge of any pollutant
by any person” illegal.10 According to the CWA, the term “discharge of a
pollutant” includes “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.”11 However, the CWA provides for “exceptions to this general
prohibition in the form of permits issued in accordance with the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which allows limited
discharges.”12 Thus, the CWA provides a “default regime of strict liability” as
any unpermitted discharge of a pollutant from a “point source” to the “navigable
waters” of the United States is prohibited, unless the polluter holds a permit.13
Generally, five requirements must be satisfied before a defendant will be
held liable under the CWA: “(1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable
waters (4) from (5) a point source.”14 According to the CWA, the term navigable
waters refers to the “waters of the United States,”15 and in Rapanos v. United
States, the Supreme Court determined that a broad interpretation of the term is
appropriate.16 Thus, rather than reading the term conservatively to include only
7
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 823 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)
(quoting Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434–35 (M.D.N.C.
2015)), rev’d, 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No.
18-1307).
8
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 438 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), as reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675) (“The CWA overhauled the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act and
the Water Quality Act of 1965 by shifting the focal point of liability … to capping effluent limitations from a
discharging source.”).
9
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 823 (quoting Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d
486, 491 (2d Cir. 2005)).
10
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012)), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
11
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012).
12
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 642 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (2012)).
13
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 823 (citing Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d
281, 284 (6th Cir. 2015)).
14
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
15
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
16
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006) (plurality opinion) (citing Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)) (“[T]he Act’s term ‘navigable waters’ includes something
more than traditional navigable waters. We have twice stated that the meaning of ‘navigable waters’ in the Act
is broader than the traditional understanding of that term.”); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
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“waters that are navigable-in-fact,” like rivers and lakes, the Court determined
that navigable waters include “wetlands and related hydrological
environments.”17 Courts, however, have disagreed over whether the CWA
regulates the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters through hydrologically
connected groundwater.18 Most of the courts that have rejected arguments
asserting the CWA encompasses a discharge of pollutants to navigable waters
through groundwater have done so based on the belief that groundwater itself is
not considered to be “a water of the United States.”19 On the other hand, at least
one court believes the issue should not be viewed “as whether the CWA
regulates the discharge of pollutants into groundwater itself,” but instead as
“whether the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters via
groundwater.”20 When the question is constructed in this manner, some courts
have utilized the conduit theory when analyzing cases concerning the discharge
of pollutants to navigable waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.21
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
17
See, e.g., Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 2018)
(citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–31, 735 (“The Supreme Court has interpreted the term ‘navigable waters’ to
mean more than waters that are navigable-in-fact, and to include, for example, wetlands and related hydrological
environs.”)), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268); see also Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 133.
18
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A]ny
alleged leakages into the groundwater are not a violation of the CWA.”), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL
1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307); Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 651 (“Accordingly, we hold in
agreement with the Second and Ninth Circuits that to qualify as a discharge of a pollutant under the CWA, that
discharge need not be channeled by a point source until it reaches navigable waters.”); Haw. Wildlife Fund v.
Cty. of Maui, 881 F.3d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the county was liable under the CWA for point
source discharges into hydrologically connected groundwater), amended and superseded by 886 F.3d 737 (9th
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019) (No. 18-260).
19
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (“Thus, when the pollutants are discharged to
the river, they are not coming from a point source; they are coming from groundwater which is a nonpoint-source
conveyance. The CWA has no say over that conduct.”); Rice v. Harken Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.
2001) (“The Rices urge this Court to apply the CWA definition of ‘navigable waters’ to the OPA. But, even that
definition is not so expansive as to include groundwater within the class of waters protected by the CWA.”);
Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining that the
CWA does not cover groundwater contamination because neither “the [CWA] nor the EPA’s definition asserts
authority over ground waters, just because these may be hydrologically connected to surface waters”); Haw.
Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 996 (D. Haw. 2014) (“Almost every court that has allowed
unpermitted discharges into groundwater has done so under the theory that the groundwater is not itself ’water
of the United States.’”), amended and superseded by 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164
(U.S. Feb. 19, 2019) (No. 18-260).
20
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 445 (M.D.N.C. 2015)
(“This Court views the issue not as whether the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants into groundwater
itself but rather whether the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters via groundwater.”).
21
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 651 (“Accordingly, we hold … that discharge need not be channeled
by a point source until it reaches navigable waters.”); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 765 (“We hold the County
liable under the CWA because … the pollutants are fairly traceable from the point source to a navigable water
such that the discharge is the functional equivalent of a discharge into the navigable water.”); Yadkin
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Under this approach, groundwater is treated merely as a conduit through which
pollutants move from the point source to nearby navigable surface waters.22
More specifically, this approach emphasizes that gravity flow, which moves
groundwater through pollutants to nearby navigable waters, can “be part of a
point source discharge if” a party “at least initially collected or channeled the
water and other materials.”23
Sources of water pollution can be divided into two categories under the
CWA: “point sources” and “nonpoint sources.”24 The statutory language of the
CWA states that a “point source” is “any discernible, confined, and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or
may be discharged.”25 Nonpoint source discharges are the result of several
dispersed discharges over a sizeable space, and it is difficult to regulate nonpoint
source discharges because they are diffuse and cannot be linked to a single
discrete source.26 While point source pollution is subject to federal regulation
under the CWA, nonpoint source pollution falls outside the scope of the CWA.27
Ultimately, when a court looks to ascertain whether a discharge originated from
a point source or a nonpoint source, “[t]he ultimate question is whether
pollutants were discharged from ‘discernible, confined, and discrete
conveyance(s)’ either by gravitational or nongravitational means.”28
Considering the broad implications of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Sierra
Club, the Supreme Court must reverse the Fourth Circuit’s decision and hold
that coal ash piles are point sources under the CWA. In Sierra Club, the Fourth
Circuit erroneously concluded that a “container,” which the CWA lists as an
Riverkeeper, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (“This Court agrees with the line of cases affirming CWA jurisdiction
over the discharge of pollutants to navigable surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater, which
serves as a conduit between the point source and the navigable waters.”).
22
See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 763 (citing Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45
(5th Cir. 1980)) (stating that gravity flow may be part of the point source, and the fact that “groundwater plays
a role in delivering the pollutants to the navigable water does not preclude liability under the statute”).
23
See id. (quoting Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 41).
24
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012); see Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d
775, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir.
1988)), rev’d, 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No.
18-1307).
25
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
26
Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 761 (quoting Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713
F.3d 502, 508 (9th Cir. 2013)).
27
See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for
cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
28
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 45.
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example of a point source,29 must itself convey pollutants “into” navigable
waters to be considered a point source. The Sierra Club court also claimed that
the seepage from the coal ash ponds was too diffuse for the ponds to be
considered “conveyances.”30 When humans construct an unlined container to
collect waste and that container leaks pollutants, however, the container is “by
definition, ‘conveying pollutants’ through those leaks.”31 It is inconsistent with
the language and the purpose of the CWA to hold that several leaks in a large,
pollutant-filled container are equivalent to diffuse discharges. More importantly,
by holding that a container must operate as a “conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters,” the court has not only limited future plaintiffs’ ability to hold
polluters liable for leaking coal ash piles under the CWA, but it has also limited
future plaintiffs’ ability to hold polluters liable for discharges from other types
of containers that fail to pass the court’s test, including underground storage
tanks, waste ponds, man-made settling basins, and coal mine impoundments.
Thus, the repercussions of this decision will extend outside of cases in which
there is an unpermitted discharge from a coal ash pond, and the decision will
have a negative impact on cases involving discharges from other types of
containers.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has contradicted their rulings in several other
cases by determining that coal ash ponds are not point sources under the CWA.
For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle indicated
that “slurry ponds, drainage ponds, coal refuse piles, and coal storage piles and
facilities” are point sources.32 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit contradicted their
ruling in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. that a
gasoline pipeline was a point source and that the CWA covers unpermitted
discharges of pollutants to navigable waters via hydrologically connected
groundwater because the gasoline pipeline itself did not “convey” gasoline “into
navigable waters.”33 This Comment will show that by inserting additional non29

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018).
31
See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)
(asserting that where a “discernible, discrete, and confined impoundment is ‘unlined and leaking pollutants’ it is
also, by definition, ‘conveying pollutants’ through those leaks” (citation omitted)), rev’d, 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
32
See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249–50 (4th Cir. 1979), rev’d sub nom. EPA v.
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing
En Banc at 5, Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403 (No. 17-1895).
33
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Under
this plain meaning, a point source is the starting point or cause of a discharge under the CWA, but that starting
point need not also convey the discharge directly to navigable waters.”), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W.
3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268); Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at
4.
30
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statutory requirements into the CWA’s definition of a point source and
excluding certain sources from the CWA’s coverage, the court in Sierra Club
has increased the likelihood of a catastrophic environmental disaster, which
would pose a significant threat to humans and wildlife.
To begin, Part I of this Comment examines recent environmental disasters
involving coal ash ponds and the dangers stemming from coal ash storage to
demonstrate that it is important for the Supreme Court to hold that coal ash ponds
are point sources under the CWA. It also highlights the relevant provisions of
the CWA to show that the term “point source” was meant to be interpreted
broadly, and that the CWA was designed to eliminate nearly all unpermitted
discharges of pollutants to surface waters. Then, Part II of this Comment will
analyze the two circuit court decisions in Tennessee Clean Water Network v.
Tennessee Valley Authority and Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. to
show how both courts analyzed the issue of whether unpermitted discharges
from coal ash ponds are covered by the CWA. Shortly thereafter, Part III argues
that the Supreme Court must establish that coal ash ponds and other “containers”
that experience groundwater and rainwater penetration are point sources under
the CWA. To bolster the assertion that the CWA should cover unpermitted
discharges from coal ash ponds, it also argues that the conduit theory is
appropriately employed in cases involving discharge from a coal ash pond to
navigable waters via hydrologically connected groundwater. Lastly, Part IV
argues that the Sierra Club court’s decision will make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prove that “containers” are point sources under the CWA, and as a
result, the Fourth Circuit has increased the probability of an environmental
disaster.
I.

COAL ASH STORAGE AND THE CWA: BACKGROUND

The Clean Water Act (CWA) is designed to prevent all unpermitted
discharges of pollutants to surface waters. Moreover, the CWA should serve as
the primary statute by which federal and state governments regulate discharges
from coal ash ponds until Congress enacts a statute that provides an adequate
solution to the coal ash problem. To understand the complexity and scope of the
issues stemming from coal ash ponds, the Supreme Court must review
background information regarding coal ash ponds and the CWA. Accordingly,
this Part will discuss (1) coal ash storage and environmental disasters involving
coal ash ponds; (2) the CWA’s citizen suit provision and the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit system; (3) the purpose of the
CWA; and (4) the language of the CWA that is relative to the issue at hand.
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Additionally, this Part will highlight the threat to the environment and human
health posed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club.
A. Coal Ash Storage and Disasters
Unlined coal ash ponds are prone to leaks. Without sufficient regulation,
they can cause catastrophic environmental disasters, and indeed, there have been
several disasters involving coal ash ponds in recent years. This Section will
discuss the process by which utilities store coal ash, the pollutants that are
contained within coal ash, and the recent environmental disasters involving coal
ash ponds.
In 2018, coal-fired power plants generated about thirty percent of the United
States’ electricity.34 According to the EPA, coal combustion residuals from
electric utilities constitute “one of the largest industrial waste streams generated
in the United States.”35 Coal combustion residuals (CCRs) are a by-product of
“coal combustion” at coal-fired power plants,36 and the term encompasses
several types of residuals, including boiler slag, flue gas desulfurization
materials, bottom ash, and fly ash.37 Nonetheless, all CCRs contain
“contaminants of environmental concern,” including cadmium, boron, lithium,
mercury, and arsenic.38 The dangers stemming from CCRs “include elevated
probabilities of ‘cancer in the skin, liver, bladder, and lungs,’ as well as noncancer risks such as ‘neurological and psychiatric effects,’ ‘cardiovascular
effects,’ ‘damage to blood vessels,’ and ‘anemia.’”39 CCRs collectively form
what is known as coal ash,40 and after coal is burned to create electricity, coalfired power plants usually store coal ash “on site in aging piles or pools that are
at varying degrees of risk of protracted leakage and catastrophic structural

34
See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.
php?id=427&t=3 (last updated Mar. 1, 2019) (listing the various ways in which American power companies
generate electricity).
35
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing Hazardous and
Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg.
21,302, 21,303 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261)).
36
Id. at 421.
37
See id.; Coal Ash Basics, ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/coalash/coal-ash-basics#01
(last updated Feb. 5, 2019).
38
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 421.
39
Id. (quoting Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,449).
40
Coal Ash Basics, supra note 37.
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failure.”41 Ultimately, it is the storage, not the production, of coal ash that poses
the greatest threat to human health and the environment.42
Coal-fired power plants produced more than 115 million tons of coal ash in
2015 alone,43 and nearly 110 million tons of coal ash were produced in 2016.44
Many coal-fired power plants sit near rivers or other surface waters, which
supply water to the steam-powered electricity generating units, and the coal ash
produced during the electricity generating process is usually stored nearby.45
Typically, coal-fired power plants store coal ash in the ground near surface
waters by channeling the coal ash into a wet surface impoundment or a dry
landfill, depending on the method that the utility uses to capture the coal ash.46
Surface impoundments are typically more than 50 acres wide with a depth of 20
feet, and on average landfills are more than 120 acres wide with a depth of 40
feet.47 Overall, there are 1,425 coal ash sites in thirty-seven states, and seventy
percent of coal ash dumps are located in impoverished areas.48 Considering that
the “risks generally stem from the fact that thousands, if not millions, of tons [of
coal ash are] placed in a single concentrated location,”49 it is important that
utilities store the coal ash in a safe and effective manner.
Furthermore, the “sheer volume of” coal ash “at these sites … can force
contaminants into the underlying soil and groundwater, threatening sources of
drinking water.”50 Stated differently, drinking water sources, including rivers
and lakes, are at risk of contamination as coal ash pollutants can leach into the

41
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 420 (citing Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals, 80
Fed. Reg. at 21,302).
42
See Jay Crowder, Note, Notice to SCOTUS: Coal Ash Should Be a Point Source Discharge Under the
Clean Water Act, 19 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 97 (2018).
43
AM. COAL ASH ASS’N, 2015 COAL COMBUSTION PRODUCT (CCP) PRODUCTION & USE SURVEY
REPORT (2015), https://www.acaa-usa.org/Portals/9/Files/PDFs/2015-Survey_Results_Table.pdf.
44
AM. COAL ASH ASS’N, 2016 COAL COMBUSTION PRODUCT (CCP) PRODUCTION & USE SURVEY
REPORT (2016), https://www.acaa-usa.org/Portals/9/Files/PDFs/2016-Survey-Results.pdf.
45
Cale Jaffe, The Toxic Legacy of Coal Ash on Southwestern Rivers, Waterways, and Reservoirs, 40 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 557, 560 (2016).
46
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 421; Robin Overby, Note, Sitting on Their Ashes:
Why Federal Regulations Should Plug the Gaping Holes in State Coal Ash Disposal Regulatory Regimes, 4
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 107, 109 (2013) (citing LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41341,
REGULATING COAL COMBUSTION WASTE DISPOSAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2010)) (stating the coal ash may
be stored in “either a surface impoundment or a landfill depending on how the coal ash waste was captured
during the electricity production process”).
47
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 421.
48
The Coal Ash Problem, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/features/the–coal–ash–problem (last
visited Oct. 6, 2018).
49
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 421–22.
50
Id. at 422.
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groundwater and travel to surface waters.51 Groundwater is stored underground
in aquifers;52 areas of high pressure in the aquifer push the groundwater away,
and from there, groundwater flows downhill through cracks and crevices in the
rocks and soil.53 As a result, groundwater will move through underground
pathways, and normally, it “discharges to surface water, such as a stream or
lake.”54 As groundwater flows out of the aquifers, it is “recharged” by rainwater
that seeps through the soil.55 Ultimately, groundwater and surface waters can be
contaminated if rainfall enters coal ash ponds before recharging groundwater, or
they can be contaminated if the coal ash ponds leak pollutants into the
groundwater.56
There is a greater risk of groundwater and surface water contamination at
sites where there is not an “adequate lining” between the soil and the coal ash.57
The vast majority of coal ash piles, seventy percent of landfills and sixty-five
percent of surface impoundments, do not have a liner.58 Legacy ponds, or
inactive coal ash impoundments, are “generally unlined and unmonitored,” and
as a result, they are prone to leaks.59 The EPA has admitted that it is “quite clear”
that unlined impoundments pose a significant threat to the environment and
human health.60 Moreover, the EPA has determined that 250 impoundments
pose a “significant” risk to human life and that there may be catastrophic
structural failures at sites located in “geologically unstable areas.”61

51
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 422 (“Surface water bodies … are also at risk of
contamination ….”); Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018) (determining that
coal ash pollutants seeped into surface waters after traveling through groundwater, but declining to regulate the
discharge under the CWA); Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 827 (M.D.
Tenn. 2017) (discussing a situation where coal ash pollutants traveled through the groundwater and into surface
waters), rev’d, 905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019)
(No. 18-1307).
52
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 757 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
53
See id.
54
See id. (“Groundwater most commonly discharges to surface water, such as a stream or lake.”).
55
See id. (“Precipitation usually recharges groundwater. The precipitation percolates through the soil to
the groundwater and recharges it.”).
56
See id. at 758 (stating that “three sources—seeps from the Bottom Ash Pond, leaks in the liner of the
Ash Landfill, and direct rainfall that flows through the inner dike—likely recharge the groundwater”).
57
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Groundwater
contamination is more likely to occur at sites that are unlined or lack adequate lining between the coal ash and
the soil beneath it.”).
58
See id. (“[M]ost most existing coal ash disposal sites—70% of landfills and 65% of surface
impoundments—have no liner at all.”).
59
Id. at 422–23.
60
Id. at 434.
61
See id. at 422.
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According to the EPA, there have been at least 157 cases in which
unmonitored coal ash piles caused damage to the environment and human
health.62 One of the “largest volume industrial spill[s] in U.S. history” took place
on December 22, 2008, and it involved an unlined coal ash pond in Kingston,
Tennessee.63 The coal ash pond was full of carcinogens and neurotoxins, and in
one year alone, the coal-fired power plant in Kingston produced 49,000 pounds
of lead, 1.4 million pounds of barium, and 45,000 pounds of arsenic.64 The spill
in Kingston stemmed from structural failure in a coal ash pond,65 and it released
nearly 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash over 300 acres of land and into a
nearby river.66 Over eighty acres of aquatic ecosystems were “completely
destroyed” after the river was contaminated, and one year later, the fish retrieved
from the river still exhibited levels of contamination that rendered them
unsuitable for human consumption.67 Officials closed the river during the two
years following the spill because it filled the river with arsenic and lead.68
Furthermore, the spill cut off power in the area, damaged several homes, and
shattered a natural gas pipe.69 As a result, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
invested $1.2 billion over four years to remove the coal ash from the Emory
River and soil in the surrounding area.70
The spill in Kingston is not the only significant spill in recent history
evidencing the threat posed by unlined coal ash piles. For instance, in 2005, over
100 million gallons of coal ash leaked from an impoundment at a Pennsylvania
coal-fired power plant into the Delaware River, and the spill resulted in the shortterm shutdown of a drinking water facility.71 Again in 2014, Duke Energy
mismanaged a coal ash pond, and it spilled 39,000 tons of coal ash into the Dan
River in Eden, North Carolina.72 Water samples were taken in the area, and they

62
Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from
Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302, 21,325 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261) (“EPA
has confirmed a total of 157 cases, both proven and potential, in which CCR mismanagement has caused damage
to human health and the environment.”).
63
See Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 423 (“The EPA recounts that public pressure to
regulate Coal Residuals escalated after an unlined surface impoundment in Kingston, Tennessee suffered
“catastrophic” structural failure on December 22, 2008.”).
64
Shaila Dewan, At Plant in Coal Ash Spill, Toxic Deposits by the Ton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at
A14.
65
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 901 F.3d at 423.
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Overby, supra note 46, at 108.
72
Duke Energy Coal Ash Spill in Eden, NC: History and Response Timeline, ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY,
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contained “extremely high levels of arsenic, chromium, iron, lead and other toxic
materials.”73 More recently, rainwaters from Hurricane Florence flooded three
coal ash ponds at a site in Goldsboro, North Carolina,74 and as a result, over
2,000 cubic yards of coal ash were emitted into the surrounding environment.75
Recent environmental studies have shown that groundwater and surface water
are “consistently and lastingly contaminated” by “coal ash ponds near 21 power
plants in five Southeastern U.S. states.”76
It is evident that unlined coal ash piles are prone to leaks, and when they are
mismanaged, human life and entire ecosystems are at risk of destruction.77 At
least one electric utility, the Georgia Power Company, has decided to excavate
and move all of its coal ash ponds to prevent future disasters.78 Going forward,
courts must hold power companies accountable and encourage them to take the
necessary precautions to prevent disasters. The holding in Sierra Club, however,
will make it easier for power companies to ignore existing coal ash ponds at their
facilities because they cannot be regulated under the CWA.79 Because pollutants
from leaking coal ash piles move through groundwater before reaching surface
waters, and because these pollutants pose a significant threat to human health
and the environment,80 it is important for the Supreme Court to establish that
coal ash piles are point sources under the CWA.

B. The Act
When deciding whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA,
the Court must look to the purpose and language of the CWA for guidance.
Furthermore, the CWA’s NPDES permit system and citizen suit provision can
be used to reduce the risks associated with leaking coal ash ponds. This Section

https://www.epa.gov/dukeenergy-coalash/history-and-response-timeline (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
73
Catherine E. Shoichet, Spill Spews Tons of Coal Ash into North Carolina River, CNN (Feb. 9, 2014,
6:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/09/us/north–carolina–coal–ash–spill/index.html.
74
Ellen M. Gilmer, Clean Water Act Doesn’t Cover Power Plant’s Arsenic—Court, GREENWIRE (Sept.
12, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060100407/search?keyword=hurricane+florence.
75
Ken Silverstein, Hurricane Florence Brings the Issue of Coal Ash Back to the Surface, FORBES (Sept.
18, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2018/09/18/hurricane–florence–brings–the–
issue–of–coal–ash–back–to–the–surface/#4b3dec031fe3.
76
Avner Vengosh, Coal Ash Ponds Found to Leak Toxic Materials, DUKE NICHOLAS SCH. ENV’T (June
10, 2016), https://nicholas.duke.edu/about/news/coal–ash–ponds–found–leak–toxic–materials.
77
See supra notes 62–67.
78
Dave Williams, Georgia Power to Excavate and Close Two More Coal Ash Ponds, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON. (Oct. 8, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2018/08/31/georgia–power–to–
excavate–and–close–two–more–coal.html.
79
See infra notes 199–203.
80
See supra notes 57–66.
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will illustrate the importance of the CWA’s citizen suit provision and NPDES
permit system, and it will describe how the two provisions operate. Then, this
Section will examine the purpose and language of the CWA in an effort to
provide clarity on this complex issue.
1. The CWA’s Citizen Suit Provision and NPDES Permit System
If coal ash ponds are considered point sources under the CWA, utilities
operating the ponds will be required to comply with all of the CWA’s provisions,
including the provisions regarding the NPDES permit system. The CWA
established the NPDES to allow limited discharges of pollutants from point
sources to navigable waters when the polluter has been issued a permit by the
appropriate regulatory authority.81 Accordingly, if an individual or entity wants
to lawfully discharge pollutants to the navigable waters of the United States, the
NPDES demands that the individual or entity obtain a permit that sets limits on
“the type and quantity of pollutants” discharged.82 More specifically, a permit
issued according to the system may impose “effluent limitations” on the rate at
which a pollutant can be discharged from a point source, and the permit can
restrict the discharge of pollutants to certain outfalls at any given site.83 The
NPDES permit may also establish “related monitoring and reporting
requirements, in order to improve cleanliness and safety of the Nation’s
waters.”84 Permits can be issued by the EPA or an authorized state
environmental regulatory agency, and the issuing entity is charged with
monitoring the polluter to ensure that they are complying with the requirements
of the permit.85
Thus, the “primary responsibility for enforcement” of the CWA “rests with
the state and federal governments.”86 If the discharger receives a permit and fails
to comply with the relative limitations established by the permit, the discharger
is deemed to have violated the CWA.87 Additionally, a polluter may violate the
81
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 2018), petition
for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
82
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 (2004); United States v.
Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979).
83
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012); Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing S.
Fl. Water Mgmt., 541 U.S. at 102).
84
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (M.D.N.C. 2015)
(quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000)).
85
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 642; cf. Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753,
761 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
86
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs, 523 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sierra Club v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 504 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 2007)).
87
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
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Act if the polluter discharges pollutants from an outflow that is not covered by
the related permit.88 To ensure compliance with the Act, government agencies
can bring suit when a polluter violates the NPDES permit or any other provision
of the CWA.89
Furthermore, the citizen suit provision of the CWA allows citizens to bring
suit when any polluter violates an “effluent standard or limitation” set forth in a
permit,90 and an “effluent standard or limitation is defined to include the Act’s
central prohibition on the ‘discharge of any pollutant’ without a permit.”91 A
“citizen,” according to the CWA, is any person or persons that have “an interest
which is or may be adversely affected” by any unpermitted discharge of
pollutants from a point source.92 By authorizing these suits, the CWA’s citizen
suit provision establishes a second layer of protection for the nation’s navigable
waters.93 At least two courts have indicated that citizen suits are designed “to
supplement rather than to supplant governmental action,” and that the purpose
of these suits is “to abate pollution when the government cannot or will not
command compliance.”94
Before a citizen suit can proceed, the prospective plaintiff must provide sixty
days’ notice regarding their intent to sue to the state agency, the EPA, and the
alleged polluter.95 During this time, the government can bring its own action
against the polluter, and the polluter may remedy its violation and “bring itself
into complete compliance with the Act.”96 Additionally, citizen suits cannot
proceed if the EPA or state is prosecuting a civil or criminal action against the
alleged violator.97 If the plaintiff satisfies the applicable requirements and the
suit against the polluter is successful, a court may impose civil penalties on the
defendant and grant injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiff.98
88
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 642 (“[A] polluter also may be in violation of the statute due to a
discharge for which the polluter could not have obtained any permit.”).
89
See id. (“The CWA authorizes both citizens and government agencies to enforce the Act’s
provisions.”).
90
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 642; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2000).
91
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 642–43 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(f), 1311(a)).
92
Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 152 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365).
93
See Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (M.D.N.C.
2015).
94
See id. (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
95
33 U.S.C § 1365(1)(A).
96
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59–60.
97
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
98
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“A successful suit may result in the award of injunctive relief and the imposition of civil penalties payable to
the United States Treasury.”).
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Overall, the NPDES permit system and the citizen suit provision are key to
enforcing the CWA and mitigating the potential risks associated with coal ash
ponds.99 If the Supreme Court determines that coal ash ponds are point sources
and subject to regulation under the CWA, utilities will be required to obtain a
permit from a federal or state agency to lawfully discharge pollutants from coal
ash ponds.100 In turn, coal ash ponds will be monitored by state and federal
regulatory agencies and limits will be placed on the quantity of pollutants that
can be emitted from coal ash ponds.101 Considering that the EPA has admitted
that many coal ash ponds across the country are prone to leaks, it is important
that these sites remain under the coverage of the CWA so that they are monitored
by the authorities. Moreover, the citizen suit provision operates as a safety net
to ensure that utilities are complying with their permits.102
If the Fourth Circuit’s decision is upheld, however, coal ash ponds will fall
outside the scope of the CWA, and citizens will no longer be able to bring suits
against utilities for unpermitted discharges from coal ash ponds. If this
enforcement mechanism is not applicable in the context of coal ash ponds, it will
increase the chances that utilities will not take the appropriate steps to ensure
that their coal ash ponds are not discharging pollutants to surface waters.
2. Purpose and Language of the CWA
In 1972, Congress created the Clean Water Act to serve as the primary means
by which federal and state regulatory agencies could control water pollution
across the United States.103 Congress designed the CWA “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”104 Ultimately, the Act was created with the objective of not only
reducing but also completely eliminating the discharge of pollutants to the
navigable waters of the United States, unless such discharges are in compliance
with other provisions of the Act.105 Moreover, the Act was designed to protect
both humans and wildlife from toxic water pollution by maintaining “water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of … wildlife” and
“recreation in and on the water.”106
99

See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
101
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102
See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
103
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 760 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
104
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
105
Id. § 1251; Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2005).
106
33 U.S.C. § 1251.
100
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Relevant to the issue at hand is the language of the Act that states, “Except
as in compliance with this … Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.”107 The phrase “discharge of any pollutant” refers to “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”108 The
Fourth Circuit recently determined that the CWA’s definition of “discharge of
any pollutant” requires that the discharge only originates from a point source,
and it stated that the “definition does not place temporal conditions on the
discharge of a pollutant from a point source.”109 In reaching this determination,
the Upstate Forever court analyzed the plain language of the statute, and it noted
that the word “from” merely indicates a “starting point or cause of a
discharge.”110 Thus, the court in Upstate Forever held that the CWA does not
require discharge to be “directly” from the point source to navigable waters.111
Considering that a “discharge of any pollutant” does not have to be directly from
the point source to navigable waters, the Fourth Circuit stated that nothing in the
CWA prevents environmental authorities from regulating indirect discharges
that travel through groundwater before reaching navigable waters.112 The Ninth
Circuit reached the same conclusion when analyzing the CWA and its definition
of “the discharge of any pollutant.”113
When looking at the language and purpose of the Act, it is clear that
Congress intended to “ban … the discharge of any pollutant by any person” to
protect the integrity of the nation’s waters.114 Additionally, according to one
court, a point source under the CWA was meant to embrace “the broadest
possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might
enter the waters of the United States.”115 Thus, it would be perplexing to hold
that the CWA encompasses “a polluter who discharges pollutants via a pipe
running from the factory directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps
the same pollutants into a man-made settling basin some distance short of the
river and then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via groundwater.”116
107

Id. § 1311.
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 647 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
109
Id. at 648.
110
Id. at 650.
111
Id. at 648.
112
Id. at 651.
113
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 881 F.3d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 2018), amended and superseded by
886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019) (No. 18-260).
114
W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012)).
115
United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979).
116
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 2017)
(quoting N. Cal. RiverWatch v. Mercer Fraser Co., No. C–04–4620 SC, 2005 WL 2122052, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
108
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Therefore, the Supreme Court should look to the purpose and language of the
Act when deciding whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA, as
it will provide some clarity on this complex issue.
II. COAL ASH CASES AND “CONTAINERS”
The holding in Sierra Club will have an impact outside the realm of coal ash
ponds, and if lower courts apply the holding from Sierra Club to other cases, the
likelihood of an environmental disaster involving any type of “container” will
increase significantly. The decision in Sierra Club and its potential to alter the
way the CWA is applied to “containers” forms the foundation of this Comment.
Moreover, the Supreme Court must reach a determination on two critical issues
in order to provide adequate protection to the nation’s waters: (1) whether the
“conduit theory” is a viable mechanism to regulate an unpermitted discharge of
pollutants to surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater; and (2)
whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA. Accordingly, this Part
will discuss (1) the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tennessee Clean Water Network
v. Tennessee Valley Authority117 and (2) the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Sierra
Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.118

A. Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority
While the Sixth Circuit has not stated whether it considers coal ash ponds to
be point sources, it is important to discuss Tennessee Clean Water Network v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, because the Sixth Circuit rejected the conduit theory
and established that the CWA does not encompass discharges from coal ash
ponds to surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.119 In
Tennessee Clean Water Network, the defendant, TVA, operated a coal-fired
power plant near the Cumberland River in Gallatin, Tennessee.120 The coal ash
produced at the plant is stored next to the river in unlined, man-made ponds.121
The TVA has two coal ash ponds at the Gallatin plant: the Non-Registered Site
(“NRS”) and the Ash Pond Complex (“Complex”).122 The Complex remains

Sept. 1, 2005)), rev’d 905 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15,
2019) (No. 18-1307).
117
See discussion infra Part II.A.
118
See discussion infra Part II.B.
119
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert.
filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
120
Id. at 438.
121
Id. at 440.
122
Id. at 439–40.
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operational, but the NRS is closed.123 The TVA closed and dewatered the NRS
in 1998, and as a result, the TVA does not have a NPDES permit for the NRS.124
The NRS holds approximately 2.3 million cubic yards of coal ash, and it is
situated on loose soil, clay, and silt.125 Thus, the district court found that some
portions of the NRS and the Complex “penetrate the water table,”126 and it
determined that there was no evidence that the leaking stopped after the pond
was “closed.”127
The Complex is a series of unlined ponds that cover nearly 476 acres, and
they hold approximately 11.5 million cubic yards of coal ash.128 The TVA has a
NPDES permit that allows it to discharge coal ash from the Complex into the
Cumberland River through a pipe.129 The permit, however, does not authorize
coal ash discharges “to land or water … from any portion of the … treatment
system other than” the pipe.130 Both parties agreed that the Complex is located
atop karst terrain.131 According to expert testimony, karst terrain is “a landscape
characterized by underground sinkholes, fissures, and caves caused by waterdissolving limestone,” and in turn, groundwater flows through the conduits in
the rock before spilling into the Cumberland River.132 After considering the
expert testimony regarding the karst terrain below the Complex, the district court
concluded that “[i]t is simply implausible, based on the evidence before the
Court, that the Complex has not continued to, and will not continue to, suffer at
least some leaking through karst features.”133
The plaintiffs, two Tennessee conservation groups, brought a CWA citizen
suit in the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging that the TVA violated the CWA
by discharging coal ash into the Cumberland River via hydrologically connected
groundwater.134 The leaking ponds at the Gallatin plant are particularly
concerning because there is a drinking water facility less than two miles

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 439–40.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 438.
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downriver from the ponds,135 and this portion of the Cumberland River, which
is known as Old Hickory Lake, is a popular recreational spot.136
On August 4, 2017, the district court rejected the TVA’s proposal to dewater
and put a cap on the unlined coal ash ponds, and the court ordered the TVA to
“fully excavate” the coal ash at both sites and relocate it to a lined pond.137 The
court determined that the injunctive remedy was necessary because the CWA
regulates the discharge of pollutants from a point source to navigable waters
through hydrologically connected groundwater, as long as the hydrological
connection between the point source and navigable waters “is direct, immediate,
and can generally be traced.”138 According to the court, the expert testimony
regarding the terrain underneath the ponds and the pollutant concentrations in
the river was sufficient to establish that the ponds were leaching coal ash into
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Cumberland River.139
Moreover, the court determined that the coal ash ponds were point sources
because they were “a series of discernible, confined, and discrete ponds that
receive wastewater, treat that wastewater, and ultimately convey it to the
Cumberland River.”140
The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the district court’s adoption of the
conduit theory, and it determined that the CWA does not cover unpermitted
discharges of pollutants to navigable waters via hydrologically connected
groundwater.141 Rather than finding that a coal ash pond is not a point source,
the Sixth Circuit held that groundwater is not a point source.142 According to its
reasoning, when pollutants enter the river via groundwater, they are not coming
from a point source, but from a nonpoint source.143 The CWA does not regulate
discharges from nonpoint sources.144
To support its decision, the court pointed to the text of the CWA.145 It stated
that the foundation of the argument in support of the conduit theory is based on
the fact that the relevant provision of the CWA does not use the word “directly,”
135
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 2017), rev’d,
905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
136
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 438.
137
Id. at 442.
138
Id. at 441.
139
Id. at 441–42.
140
Id. at 441.
141
See id. at 446.
142
Id. at 444.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
See id. at 443–44 (asserting that “[t]he CWA’s text suggests otherwise”).
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as it only prohibits discharges “to navigable waters from any point source.”146
Thus, proponents of the conduit theory, like the district court, argued that “the
CWA allows for pollutants to travel from a point source through nonpoint
sources en route to navigable waters.”147
The Sixth Circuit combatted this argument by pointing to “effluent
limitations,” which set the standard of liability for polluters under the CWA.148
According to the court, effluent limitations serve as caps on the quantity of
pollutants that may be discharged from a point source, and the CWA “defines
effluent limitations as restrictions on the amount of pollutants that may be
‘discharged from point sources into navigable waters.’”149 After interpreting the
word “into,” the court determined that an element of directness must be present
in discharge before it is regulated under the CWA, and it held that “for a point
source to discharge into navigable waters, it must dump directly into those
navigable waters.”150 Accordingly, the court determined that the coal ash, in this
case, was not being dumped directly into the Cumberland River from a point
source, and as a result, the discharges at the Gallatin plant were not regulated by
the CWA.151
The court also addressed the plaintiff’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rapanos.152 The plaintiff utilized the portion of the opinion in
Rapanos that established that “the CWA does not forbid the ‘addition of any
pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”153 The court believed that this
quote had been taken out of context, and that Justice Scalia pointed out a lack of
directness to show that a discharge of pollutants can be regulated under the CWA
if it travels through several point sources before spilling into navigable waters.154

146
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added); Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (citing Ky.
Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., No. 18–5115, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27283 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2018)).
147
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444.
148
See id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 444–45. In Rapanos, the Supreme Court consolidated two cases and granted certiorari to
determine whether four Michigan wetlands constituted “waters of the United States” under the CWA. Rapanos
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006). The wetlands were positioned near ditches and man-made drains
that eventually emptied into “traditional” navigable waters. Id. at 729–30. In one case, the petitioners discharged
fill material “without a permit” into the wetlands, and in the other case, the petitioners were denied a permit to
discharge fill material into a wetland located near a lake. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that there was federal jurisdiction over the wetlands. Id. at 730.
153
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729–30).
154
Id. 444–45.
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According to the court, Scalia never contemplated the “point source to nonpoint
source dumping” that was present in this case.155
Lastly, the court claimed that the CWA protects the states’ rights and
responsibilities. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that allowing the CWA to cover
discharges to navigable waters through hydrologically connected groundwater
would interfere with the administration of other federal statutes like the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).156 According to the court,
RCRA specifically covers coal ash ponds and “explicitly exempts from its
coverage any pollution that is subject to CWA regulation.”157 In turn, the Sixth
Circuit believed that by holding that the CWA covers a discharge of pollutants
to navigable waters via hydrologically connected groundwater, the district court
rendered RCRA’s regulations regarding coal ash ponds useless.158
Even though the Sixth Circuit did not state whether it considered a coal ash
pond to be a point source, the decision in Tennessee Clean Water Network is
important because it placed coal ash ponds outside the reach of the CWA.159 The
decision in the case is contrary to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ rulings that the
CWA covers unpermitted discharges from point sources to navigable waters via
hydrologically connected groundwater,160 and the court’s ruling will make it
difficult for plaintiffs to bring suit against utilities that operate coal ash
impoundments. Thus, like the decision in Sierra Club, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision will have a negative impact on the environment and human health
because most coal ash ponds discharge pollutants to navigable waters via
hydrologically connected groundwater. The Supreme Court should overrule this
decision, and instead, the Court should follow the line of reasoning that has been
upheld by the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
B. Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
In Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., the court focused on the
question of whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA.161 In this
155

Id. at 445.
See id. at 446.
157
Id. at 445.
158
See id. at 445 (“[R]eading the CWA in this way would remove coal ash treatment and storage practices
from RCRA’s coverage.”).
159
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
160
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018), petition
for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268); Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 881
F.3d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 2018), amended and superseded by 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S.
Ct. 1164 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019) (No. 18-260).
161
See infra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
156
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case, the defendant, Dominion Electric, operated a coal-fired power plant on a
peninsula near the Deep Creek and Elizabeth River in Chesapeake, Virginia.162
Dominion shut the plant down in 2014, but it did not finish depositing coal ash
at the site until October 2015.163 Over a period of sixty years, Dominion pumped
coal ash into various ponds, and in accordance with a NPDES permit, it
discharged pollutants into nearby navigable waters.164 Dominion stored coal ash
in three ponds, which the district court termed the “Historic Pond,” from 1953
to 1984.165 In 1984, Dominion constructed a coal ash landfill on top of a portion
of the unlined Historic Pond and left the coal ash underneath in place.166
Subsequently, Dominion constructed another unlined settling pond at the site to
store coal ash.167 Collectively, the coal ash ponds at the site hold about 3.3
million tons of coal ash, and approximately 150 tons of arsenic is stored at the
site.168 Dominion’s NPDES permit required the utility to monitor the level of
arsenic in the groundwater near the plant.169 To monitor the site, Dominion built
wells around the edge of the plant that were used to test the groundwater.170
Additional permits identified the specific locations at which Dominion was
allowed to discharge pollutants, and they established that Dominion was only
allowed to discharge a certain amount of pollutants to surface waters.171
In 2002, Dominion conducted tests which revealed that the arsenic levels in
the groundwater surrounding the facility exceeded the limit set by the regulatory
authority.172 Again, in 2014 and 2015, samples of groundwater taken from
various wells at the site revealed that levels of arsenic exceeded the standards
set by regulatory authorities.173 As a result, Dominion launched several
investigations to determine whether groundwater at the site was hydrologically
connected to nearby navigable waters, and it concluded that “groundwater,”
stored in aquifers beneath the site, “moves laterally into the surrounding surface
water” after it flows through the coal ash stored at the site.174 When Sierra Club
162

Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 407–08 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 408.
164
Id. at 405–08.
165
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 756 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 757.
168
See id. (“In total, the Historic Pond, Ash Landfill, Bottom Ash Pond, and Sedimentation Pond
(collectively, ‘the Coal Ash Piles’) currently hold about 2,830,000 cubic yards or 3,396,000 tons of coal ash.”).
169
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 408.
170
Id.
171
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
172
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 408.
173
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
174
Id. at 758.
163
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filed a lawsuit, however, Dominion made arguments that contradicted its own
findings, and their experts and representatives stated that “the movement of
groundwater does not directly connect with the surface water, because the
aquifer confines the groundwater and impedes it from reaching the surface
water.”175 Additionally, Dominion’s experts and representatives claimed that
“any arsenic in the surface water surrounding the CEC, or in the sediments at
the bottom of those waters, probably comes from other industries in the area.”176
In March of 2015, Sierra Club filed a suit against Dominion under the citizen
suit provision of the CWA, alleging that Dominion violated the CWA by
discharging pollutants to the navigable waters surrounding the site.177
Specifically, it alleged that the coal ash ponds were point sources under the
CWA, and “that arsenic leached from them into the groundwater, which was
‘hydrologically connected’ to the Elizabeth River and Deep Creek, thereby
carrying arsenic to navigable waters.”178 The district court determined that the
coal ash ponds at the site were point sources under the CWA, and it held that the
CWA covers unpermitted discharges of pollutants to surface waters via
hydrologically connected groundwater.179 As a result, the court held that
Dominion was violating the CWA by discharging arsenic to navigable waters
from point sources.180 In reaching its determination that coal ash piles are point
sources under the CWA, the district court stated that “the ultimate question is
whether pollutants were discharged from discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance[s] either by gravitational or nongravitational means.”181 According
to the district court, Dominion constructed the ponds to concentrate coal ash in
a central location, and the ponds acted as “discrete mechanisms that convey
pollutants from the old power plant to the river.”182
Shortly thereafter, Dominion appealed the district court’s ruling that coal ash
piles were point sources and that the CWA covered unpermitted discharges of
pollutants to groundwater,183 and the Fourth Circuit ultimately overturned the
lower court’s ruling that Dominion’s coal ash ponds were point sources.184 When

175

Id.
Id. at 759.
177
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 406.
178
Id. at 408.
179
Id. at 406.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 410 (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Hernshaw Partners, LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 589,
599 (S.D. W. Va. 2013)).
182
Id.
183
Id. at 409.
184
Id. at 406 (“[W]e reverse the district court’s ruling that Dominion was liable under § 1311(a) of the
176
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deciding whether the CWA covers unpermitted discharges to groundwater, the
Fourth Circuit applied the precedent it set in Upstate Forever, which established
that unpermitted discharges of pollutants from point sources to groundwater are
covered under the CWA when the plaintiff can demonstrate “a direct
hydrological connection between [the] ground water and surface water.”185 The
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion on the issue because the
facts in Sierra Club were enough to establish a direct hydrological connection
between the groundwater and surface water near the site.186 On the second issue,
however, the court in Sierra Club reversed the district court’s ruling and held
that Dominion’s coal ash ponds were not point sources under the CWA.187
The Fourth Circuit framed the issue in a relatively simple manner where the
ultimate question was whether the coal ash piles were point sources because they
permitted precipitation to seep through them and carry pollutants to the
groundwater.188 To answer this question, Dominion argued that the coal ash piles
were “stationary feature[s] of the landscape through which rainwater or
groundwater can move diffusely,”189 and in turn, the utility argued that the coal
ash piles did not fulfill the statutory definition of a point source as a “discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance.”190 The Sierra Club court agreed with
Dominion’s analysis of the issue, and it looked to the language of the Act to
bolster its reasoning.191 Specifically, the court focused on the word
“conveyance” as it is used in the CWA’s definition of a point source, and it
highlighted the fact that the point source must not act as a “generalized
conveyance.”192 To further its point, the court examined the dictionary definition
of “conveyance,” and pointed out that a conveyance “requires a channel or
medium—that is, a facility—for the movement of something from one place to
another.”193

Act.”).
185
Id. at 409 (citing Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir.
2018), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268)).
186
Id.
187
See id. at 412 (“By contrast, the coal ash piles and ponds, from which arsenic diffusely seeped, can
hardly be construed as discernible, confined, or discrete conveyances, as required by the Clean Water Act.”).
188
See id. at 410.
189
Id. at 409.
190
Id.
191
See id. at 410 (“At its core, the Act’s definition makes clear that some facility must be involved that
functions as a discrete, not generalized, ‘conveyance.’”).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 410–11 (first citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 499 (1961); and then
citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 291–92 (1976)).
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The court, in construing this language in its favor, was quick to point out that
Dominion’s coal ash piles were not constructed to convey anything, “such as a
pipe or ditch would be,” but rather, they were actually constructed to store coal
ash in one central location.194 The Sierra Club court held that the whole site
suffered from “generalized,” “diffuse seepage” in which rainwater and
groundwater gushed through the coal ash piles and carried pollutants to nearby
surface waters.195 According to the court, the coal ash piles were “static
recipients of the precipitation and groundwater that flowed through them,” and
as a result, they fell outside the reach of the CWA.196 This reasoning allowed the
court to show that the “conveying action” highlighted by the district court was
merely a result of groundwater and rainwater moving through the coal ash
piles.197 Stated more simply, the court believed that the discharge of pollutants
to surface waters, in this case, was not “a function of the coal ash piles” as the
Act requires, but instead, it was “the result of a natural process” where rainwater
seeped through the ground before it reached navigable waters near the facility.198
Additionally, the court stated that when “a source works to convey a pollutant,
the concentration of the pollutant and the rate at which it is discharged by that
conveyance can be measured.”199 In this case, however, the court pointed out
that the district court could not determine how much arsenic from the coal ash
ponds reached nearby surface waters, and it said that this finding contradicted
the effluent limitation scheme imposed by the CWA.200
Sierra Club argued that the coal ash piles at the site were “containers,” which
the CWA lists as an example of a point source.201 Although the court admitted
that the coal ash pond was a container by definition, the court also pointed out
that a container must still function as a conveyance of pollutants to surface
waters to be considered a point source under the CWA.202 In this case, pollutants
were not draining into navigable waters from a ditch or a pipe connected to the
pond, but rather, they were flowing into navigable waters due to precipitation
and groundwater seepage.203 Thus, the court asserted that the pond itself was not
conveying pollutants to navigable waters.204 Moreover, the court addressed the
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

See id. at 411 (stating that the coal ash piles were not constructed to “convey anything”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id. at 412.
See id.
Id.
Id.at 412–13.
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cases that Sierra Club cited in support of its assertion that various other courts
had found facilities, outside the context of coal ash ponds, to be point sources
when they appeared to be containers.205 In a rather vague attempt to distinguish
those cases from the case at hand, the court contended that in each case cited by
Sierra Club, the containers at issue were constructed to be a part of an active
system, rather than a passive system, that conveyed pollutants.206
Overall, the Fourth Circuit concluded that even if a facility is some type of
a container, it must “be functioning as a conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters to qualify as a point source.”207 More specifically, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the discharge of pollutants to surface waters in Sierra
Club was not “a function of the coal ash piles” as the Act requires, but instead,
it was “the result of a natural process” where rainwater seeped through the
ground before it reached navigable waters.208 Thus, the holding in Sierra Club
may remove any type of “container” that discharges pollutants to navigable
waters via a “natural process” from the CWA’s coverage.
III. COAL ASH PONDS UNDER THE CWA: ANALYSIS
The Sierra Club court created a situation where utilities that maintain coal
ash ponds are essentially exempt from liability under the CWA, and as a result,
there is a significant risk that humans and wildlife will be exposed to deadly
pollutants. To prevent environmental disasters involving coal ash ponds and
mitigate the dangers stemming from coal ash storage, the Supreme Court must
interpret the term “point source” broadly and follow the case law that is relevant
to the issue at hand. Furthermore, the Court must also decide that the “conduit
theory” can be used to regulate unpermitted discharges that travel to surface
waters via hydrologically connected groundwater if it hopes to remedy the coal
ash problem. Therefore, this Part argues that (1) the language and purpose of the
CWA support the claim that a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA,
(2) other cases involving “containers” indicate that a point source may be present
when the discharge was the “result of a natural process,” and (3) the “conduit
theory” should be used to regulate unpermitted discharges of pollutants to
surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.

205
Id. at 412–13 (first citing United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979); and
then citing Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)).
206
See id. (“The passive coal ash piles and ponds here are hardly analogous.”).
207
Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
208
See id.
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A. Coal Ash Ponds Are Point Sources Under the CWA
This Section offers a critique of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club,
and it discusses a variety of arguments that the Supreme Court should utilize to
upend the Fourth Circuit’s decision. More specifically, this Section will argue
that the language and purpose of the Act support the finding that a coal ash pond
is a point source under the CWA. It will also apply the decisions from other
cases to the facts in Sierra Club to show that a point source may be present when
the discharge was “the result of a natural process,” like rainwater and
groundwater penetration. Finally, this Section will argue that while this issue is
complex and confusing in many respects, it is important for the Supreme Court
to hold that coal ash ponds are point sources under the CWA to prevent future
harms to human health and the environment.
1. The Language and Purpose of the CWA Support the Claim that Coal Ash
Ponds Are Point Sources
When deciding whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA,
the explicit language and purpose of the CWA is more persuasive than any other
analytical tool utilized by the Sierra Club court. Above all else, the CWA was
enacted to “maintain the … integrity of the Nation’s waters”209 by banning “the
discharge of any pollutant by any person,”210 so in turn, several courts have
interpreted that a “point source” was meant to embrace “the broadest possible
definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the
waters of the United States.”211 The Sierra Club court, however, took the
opposite approach, and it limited the definition of a point source to only capture
situations where a facility is “functioning as a conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters.”212 Therefore, it appears that the Fourth Circuit disregarded
an interpretive practice that was employed by several courts, and as a result, the
Fourth Circuit has diminished the coverage of the CWA and prevented courts
from achieving the CWA’s primary objective.
Furthermore, it would contradict the purpose of the CWA for a court to hold
that the CWA covers “a polluter who discharges pollutants via a pipe running

209

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a)).
211
See, e.g., United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979); Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal., Inc., v. Hernshaw Partners, LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (S.D. W. Va. 2013) (“[T]he definition of a
‘point source’ is intended to be interpreted broadly….”).
212
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).
210
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from the factory directly to the riverbank, but not a polluter who dumps the same
pollutants into a man-made settling basin some distance short of the river and
then allows the pollutants to seep into the river via groundwater.”213 The Fourth
Circuit in Sierra Club, however, reached the determination that the court in
Northern California River Watch v. Mercer Fraser Co. advocated against.214 By
determining that a point source is present only when the discharge is a “function
of the coal ash ponds” themselves, the Sierra Club court has created a gap in the
Act where utilities that maintain coal ash ponds can escape liability under the
CWA by depositing coal ash in large, unlined ponds and allowing the pollutants
to seep into groundwater and travel to surface waters.215 The Fourth Circuit’s
decision does not advance the CWA’s primary goal of protecting the nation’s
waters, and there is no indication that Congress intended the CWA to operate in
this way.
When deciding whether a coal ash pond is a point source, the Supreme Court
must also be guided by the statutory definition of a point source, which specifies
that a point source is a “[1] discernible, [2] confined, and [3] discrete [4]
conveyance.”216 In Sierra Club, the Fourth Circuit focused on the “conveyance”
element of the statutory definition, and the court held that a coal ash pond must
be “functioning as a conveyance of the pollutant into navigable waters” to be
considered a point source.217 The court also found that the coal ash ponds were
not “functioning as conveyances” because the “movement of pollutants” was
“the result of a natural process of precipitation percolating through the soil to
the groundwater.”218 This interpretation of the “conveyance” requirement,
however, conflicts with the CWA’s language219 and the decisions of several
circuit and district courts,220 including the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in
Upstate Forever.221
213

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
215
Id.
216
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2017), rev’d,
905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
217
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
218
Id.
219
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
220
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 43–44 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a point source
even though the pollutants “were carried by natural forces,” including “erosion caused by rainwater runoff”);
United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (“When it fails because of flaws in the
construction or inadequate size to handle the fluids utilized … the escape of liquid from the confined system is
from a point source.”); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Hernshaw Partners, LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 589, 599
(S.D. W. Va. 2013).
221
See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he
pipeline is the starting point and cause of pollution that has migrated and is migrating through ground water to
214
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In Upstate Forever, the Fourth Circuit examined a case where a gasoline
pipeline ruptured and spilled over 100,000 gallons of gasoline into the ground.222
Consequently, gasoline seeped into the groundwater, which was hydrologically
connected to nearby surface waters.223 In determining that the discharge was
covered by the CWA, the court in Upstate Forever determined that the point
source need not “convey the discharge directly to navigable waters,” and the
court stressed that gravity, which “naturally washes” pollutants downstream, can
be part of a point source discharge.224 The court in Upstate Forever pointed to
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos to confirm that the language of the
CWA supports the proposition that a point source discharge may be present
when a pollutant “naturally” flows to surface waters.225 Thus, the two Fourth
Circuit decisions are contradictory.226 The court in Sierra Club determined that
the coal ash ponds were not point sources because “the actual means of
conveyance was the rainwater and groundwater flowing … through the soil.”227
But in Upstate Forever, the conveying action of the gasoline pipeline resulted
from a similar “natural process,”228 which, according to the court in Sierra Club,
means the “movement of pollutants” from the gasoline pipeline to navigable
waters was not a “function of” the pipeline itself.229 Moreover, the language of
the CWA does not indicate that “the conveying action” must be “a function of
the coal ash ponds” for the ponds to be considered point sources.230 The Sierra
Club court has inserted a nonstatutory requirement into the CWA’s point source
definition by determining that the coal ash pond itself must act as a “conveyance
of the pollutant into navigable waters,” and this contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s
recent holding in Upstate Forever.231
Similarly, while analyzing the conveyance element, the Fourth Circuit
inserted an additional, nonstatutory requirement into the CWA’s point source
definition by suggesting that Dominion’s coal ash ponds were not point sources
because they “were not created to convey anything and did not function in that

navigable waters.”), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
222
Id. at 641.
223
See id. (analyzing a case where gasoline spewed from a burst pipe).
224
Id. at 649–50.
225
See id. at 650 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–38 (2006)).
226
Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at 3–4.
227
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2018).
228
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 651 (“[T]he pipeline is the starting point and cause of pollution that
has migrated and is migrating through ground water to navigable waters.”).
229
See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
230
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). But see Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
231
See Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at 3–4.
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manner.”232 According to the language of the CWA, a point source is “any
discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance,” but the Act does not state that
a facility must have been “created to convey anything” to qualify as a point
source.233 Moreover, the suggestion that a facility must have been “created to
convey” pollutants to qualify as a point source contradicts the plain language of
the CWA, specifically the language of the Act that indicates a “container” is a
point source.234 While the CWA does not define the word “container” as it is
used in the point source definition, the Fourth Circuit has usually followed the
plain language of the CWA when looking to ascertain the meaning of certain
undefined words and provisions in the Act.235 Accordingly, when analyzing the
plain meaning of the word “container,” it is clear that a “container” is a facility
“used to hold or store things in.”236 Under this plain meaning, a “container,” like
a coal ash pond, need not be “created to convey anything” to be considered a
point source as the Sierra Club court suggests, but rather, the polluter may
construct the “container” in an effort to “hold or store” pollutants. Thus, it would
be appropriate for a court to hold that the CWA only requires that a “container”
be functioning as a conveyance at the time of the alleged discharge to qualify as
a point source, and the “container” does not have to be “created to convey
anything.” Correspondingly, the district court in Tennessee Clean Water
Network correctly held that “where a discernible, discrete, and confined [coal
ash] impoundment is ‘unlined and leaking pollutants’ it is … by definition”
functioning as a conveyance under the CWA.237
The Sierra Club court contradicted their own decision in Upstate Forever,
along with the language and purpose of the CWA, by holding that the coal ash
ponds were not “functioning as conveyances” because the “movement of
pollutants” was “the result of a natural process ….”238 As evidenced above, a
“point source” was meant to be interpreted in accordance with the “broadest
232

See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 411 (emphasis added).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (emphasis added).
234
See id. § 1362(14) (2012) (emphasis added) (defining a point source and listing a “container” as an
example).
235
See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 2018) (first
citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 913 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 2002); and
then citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 729 (3d ed. 1992)) (“The word
‘from’ indicates ‘a starting point: as (1) a point or place where an actual physical movement … has its
beginning.’”), petition for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
236
Container, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/container
(last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
237
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2017), rev’d,
905 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
238
See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018). But see Upstate Forever,
887 F.3d at 651.
233
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possible definition,”239 but the Sierra Club court failed to adhere to this
principle. Moreover, in determining that the seepage at Dominion’s site was
“diffuse” nonpoint source pollution,240 the Sierra Club court has created a
loophole in the CWA by which utilities, like Dominion, can escape liability
under the CWA by depositing pollutants into large, unlined ponds and allowing
the pollutants to seep into groundwater that is hydrologically connected to
surface water. This outcome is something that Congress surely did not intend
when it enacted the statute to “maintain the … integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”241 It is also clear that while the seepage at Dominion’s site may seem
“diffuse” at first glance, this categorization is ultimately indefensible. It is
illogical and inconsistent with the purpose of the CWA to argue that the seepage
stemming from Dominion’s coal ash ponds constituted “diffuse” seepage simply
because there were several leaks in a large, unlined, and pollutant-filled
container.242
2. Other Cases Involving “Containers” Support the Claim That Coal Ash
Ponds Are Point Sources Under the CWA
The court in Sierra Club held that even if the coal ash ponds were
“containers,” they failed to satisfy the conveyance element of the “point source”
definition because the discharge resulted from a “natural process.”243 On the
other hand, several district courts and circuit courts have determined that the
CWA encompasses discharges from facilities that act as “containers,” even
though the “movement of pollutants” was “the result of a natural process,” like
“precipitation percolating through the soil to the groundwater.”244 Speaking
directly to the issue at hand, at least one other district court in the Fourth Circuit
answered the question of whether a coal ash pond is a point source under the
CWA.245 In Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, the
district court judge determined that coal ash lagoons were point sources under

239
See, e.g., United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979); Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal., Inc. v. Hernshaw Partners, LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 589, 598 (S.D. W. Va. 2013).
240
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
241
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
242
The Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club determined that several leaks in a large, unlined, and pollutant filled
container constituted “diffuse seepage.” See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412. On the other hand, the
court seemed to indicate that the coal ash pond would be a point source if there was one large leak in the coal
ash pond or the coal ash pond discharged pollutants to navigable waters via a pipe or ditch. Id. All of the
aforementioned situations, however, produce the same result: Traceable amounts of pollutants are discharged to
navigable waters.
243
See id.
244
See id. But see supra note 220 and accompanying text.
245
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d 428, 443 (M.D.N.C. 2015).
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the CWA because they were “confined and discrete” conveyances.246 The
facilities at issue, in this case, were large coal ash lagoons located at the
defendant utility’s Buck Steam Station along the banks of the Yadkin River, and
the defendant allegedly discharged pollutants, through several seeps in the coal
ash lagoons, to navigable waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.247
In reaching the determination that the discharge by the defendant was
encompassed by the CWA, the district court found that the coal ash ponds were
“unlined and leaking pollutants to the groundwater,” so by definition, the coal
ash lagoons were “conveying pollutants to navigable waters.”248 The district
court arrived at its conclusion in part because the purpose of the CWA demands
a broad interpretation of the term “point source.”249 Moreover, in reaching its
decision, the district court correctly applied the holdings of other courts to the
facts of its case, specifically holdings from other courts that indicated similar
types of “containers” were functioning as conveyances when the discharge
resulted from a “natural process.”250 The Sierra Club court, however, construed
the term “point source” narrowly and chose not to follow the case law cited in
Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc.251 More importantly, by ignoring the holding and
reasoning from Yadkin Riverkeeper, Inc., the Fourth Circuit has increased the
likelihood of an environmental disaster involving coal ash ponds.
Case law outside the context of coal ash ponds also supports the claim that
Dominion’s ponds are point sources under the CWA, as evidenced by United
States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.252 There, the defendant, Earth Sciences, operated
a gold leaching facility in which gold ore was sprayed with a cyanide-sodium
hydroxide water solution (leachate solution) to separate the gold from the ore.253
The leachate solution was collected in a “small fiberglass-lined pool,”254 but
snowmelt from the surrounding area penetrated the pool and caused the leachate
solution to seep out of the pool and into a nearby creek.255 The EPA brought suit
against Earth Sciences for violating the CWA, and Earth Sciences argued on

246

Id. at 444.
Id. at 435–36.
248
Id. at 443–44.
249
Id. at 444 (first citing Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991); and then citing
United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979)).
250
See id. (citing Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1312, 1321 (D. Or. 1997)).
251
See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018).
252
See Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d at 374.
253
Id. at 370.
254
Id.
255
See id.
247
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appeal that the “pools” were nonpoint sources under the CWA.256 On the other
hand, the government highlighted the fact that a “container” is listed in the CWA
as an example of a point source.257 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit stated that
this “pool” was a point source despite its “large capacity.”258
While the discharge stemming from Earth Sciences’ “pool” was caused by a
“natural process,” the Tenth Circuit nonetheless concluded that “excess rainfall
or snow melt … is not the kind of general runoff considered to be from nonpoint
sources” when the polluter’s “pool” fails due to “flaws in the construction.”259
This determination supports the claim that Dominion’s coal ash ponds are point
sources under the CWA because “flaws in the construction” of the coal ash
ponds allowed rainwater and groundwater to carry pollutants from the ponds to
navigable waters.260 The Sierra Club court, however, attempted to address the
Tenth Circuit’s holding by highlighting the fact that Earth Sciences’ pool was a
part of a larger system that “conveyed” pollutants, and the discharge in Earth
Sciences, Inc. occurred while the pollutants were being conveyed through the
system.261 The Fourth Circuit’s assessment here, however, ignores a key fact:
Earth Sciences’ pool was intended to contain, not convey, the pollutants that
were stored in the system, and the conveyance of pollutants to surface waters
resulted from a “natural process.”262 More specifically, the discharge of
pollutants to navigable waters, or the conveying action, was not “a function of”
Earth Sciences’ pool, but instead, it was the result of penetration by “excess
rainfall” and “snowmelt,” which is comparable to the “precipitation” that
“percolated through the soil to the groundwater” in Sierra Club.263 Thus, it is
256

Id. at 373.
See id. at 374 (“The government emphasizes the terms ‘well,’ ‘container’ and references to a
concentrated feeding operation as a point source.”).
258
See id.
259
See id. (“When it fails because of flaws in the construction or inadequate size to handle the fluids
utilized, with resulting discharge, whether from a fissure in the dirt berm or overflow of a wall, the escape of
liquid from the confined system is from a point source. Although the source of the excess liquid is rainfall or
snow melt, this is not the kind of general runoff considered to be from nonpoint sources under the FWPCA.”).
260
Dominion concluded that “groundwater,” stored in aquifers beneath the site, “moves laterally into the
surrounding surface water” after it flows through the coal ash stored at the site. See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 758 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
Without an adequate liner, groundwater and rainwater penetrated the coal ash ponds, and this would indicate
that there was a flaw in the construction of the ponds. See id.
261
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 413 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Earth Scis., Inc., 599
F.2d at 374) (“In other words, in the process of conveying this contaminated liquid through the system, the liquid
escaped.”).
262
See id. at 412. But see Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d at 370 (“The entire operation consists of several open
excavations lined with plastic membrane … all designed to be a closed system without any pollutant
discharge.”); Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at 7.
263
See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
257
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evident that Earth Sciences’ pool itself was not acting “as a conveyance of the
pollutant into navigable waters”264 as the court in Sierra Club requires.
The Fifth Circuit, in Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co. analyzed a case
involving “sediment basins,” which were designed to catch and store rainwater
runoff that flowed through mining pits and carried away pollutants.265 Similar to
the defendant’s argument before the Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club, Abston
Construction argued that the sediment basins were not point sources because the
discharges from the sediment basins resulted from “natural forces,” like erosion
caused by rainwater runoff.266 While the Fifth Circuit stated that the lower court
needed to gather more facts on remand to determine whether the sediment basin
was appropriately categorized as a “container,”267 the Abston Construction Co.
court established that “[g]ravity flow … may be part of a point source discharge
if the miner at least initially collected … the water and other materials,” and
“[e]xamples of point source pollution … are the collection, and subsequent
percolation, of surface waters in the pits …”268 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
in Abston Construction Co. seems to contradict the Fourth Circuit’s assertion in
Sierra Club269 that a facility cannot be functioning as a conveyance if the
discharge is a result of natural processes, like groundwater penetration and
rainwater runoff.
The court in Sierra Club admitted that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Abston
Construction Co. established that “the source of a pollutant regulated” under the
CWA “might be a spoil or refuse pile.”270 However, the Fourth Circuit, in an
attempt to square its holding with the Fifth Circuit’s holding, claimed the Fifth
Circuit “noted that the facilities that actually transport the pollutant must be point
sources—giving as examples, ‘ditches, gullies, and similar conveyances.’”271
However, the court in Abston Construction Co. did not hold that “the facilities
that … transport the pollutant must be point sources.” The Fifth Circuit simply
264

Id.
See Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Rainwater runoff or water
draining from within the mined pit at times carried the material to adjacent streams, causing siltation and acid
deposits. In an effort to halt runoff, the miners here occasionally constructed ‘sediment basins,’ which were
designed to catch the runoff before it reached the creek.”).
266
See id. at 43–44 (“Instead, any water and other materials that were deposited in Daniel Creek were
carried by natural forces, mostly erosion caused by rainwater runoff.”).
267
See id. at 47 (“Furthermore, factual findings are lacking insofar as the sediment basins and other devices
may be characterized as encompassing ‘container(s), … from which pollutants are or may be discharged.’”
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012))).
268
Id. at 45.
269
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
270
Id. at 413.
271
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)).
265
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looked to see if the defendant “initially collected or channeled the water and
other materials,” and in turn, it determined that the “[s]ediment basins dug by
the miners and designed to collect sediment” were point sources “even though
the materials were carried away from the basins by gravity flow ….”272 Thus, it
is apparent that the point sources in Abston Construction Co. were the sediment
pits, and “gravity flow,” which transported the pollutants from the sediment pits
to navigable waters, was considered to be a “part of” the “point source
discharge.” Similarly, Dominion’s ponds were constructed to collect coal ash,
and the pollutants “were carried away by gravity flow.” Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion supports the claim that coal ash ponds are point sources under
the CWA.
In United States v. Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., the district court analyzed
coal mine impoundments and settlement ponds that were used to store
byproducts from a coal mining operation, and the court determined that the
impoundments and settlement ponds were point sources under the CWA.273
While there was no indication that the ponds were “functioning as conveyances
of pollutants into navigable waters,”274 the court nonetheless determined that the
ponds and impoundments were still covered by the CWA.275 Similarly, the same
district court, in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Hernshaw
Partners, LLC, analyzed a “valley fill” that was constructed to store byproducts
from a nearby coal mine.276 The defendant, in this case, argued that the
discharges from the valley fill were nonpoint source discharges because “any
flow emanating from the valley fill” was the result of rainwater runoff or
groundwater penetration.277 The court, however, construed the definition of a
point source broadly,278 and after considering the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Abston Construction Co., Inc. and the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Earth Sciences,
Inc., it determined that the valley fill was a point source under the CWA.279
The court explained its decision by highlighting the fact that nonpoint source
pollution “is limited to uncollected runoff water which is difficult to ascribe to

272
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d at 45; Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note
32, at 6–7.
273
United States v. Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., Civil Action No. 2:14–11609, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165842,
at *1–2 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 26, 2014).
274
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
275
Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165842, at *1–2.
276
984 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (S.D. W. Va. 2013).
277
Id. at 598.
278
See id. (“However, the definition of a ‘point source’ is intended to be interpreted broadly, as indicated
by the statute’s ‘including but not limited to’ language.” (citations omitted)).
279
Id. at 599.
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one polluter.”280 As a result, the court found that “[u]nlike uncollected rainfall
runoff, water discharged from … the valley fill is easily ascribed to a single
source: the valley fill.”281 Applying the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition
court’s opinion to the facts of Sierra Club, it is clear that the discharge of arsenic
to navigable waters was a point source discharge under the CWA as it was easily
ascribed to “a single source,” which was Dominion’s coal ash ponds. Ultimately,
rather than limiting the definition of a point source to only capture facilities
where the discharge was a function of the facility itself like the Fourth Circuit
did in Sierra Club, the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition court determined
that a point source may be present when natural forces, like rainwater runoff and
the flow of groundwater, cause the “container” to convey pollutants to navigable
waters.282
Looking outside the context of mining operations and in further support of
reversing the holding of Sierra Club, the district court in Umatilla Waterquality
Protective Association v. Smith Frozen Foods determined that an unlined brine
pond was a point source when it was discharging pollutants to navigable waters
via hydrologically connected groundwater.283 In holding that the unlined brine
pond was a point source under the CWA, the court determined that “the Ninth
Circuit has indicated that a discharger does not need to be actively conveying
the pollutants to navigable waters—only that the discharger collected the
discharged material prior to the discharge.”284 The court concluded by showing
that the unlined brine pond was a “discrete conveyance,” despite the fact that the
pollutants “migrated through dirt with the help of water sources such as rain
water and gravity….”285 Comparably, in Sierra Club, the defendant was not
actively conveying the pollutants to navigable waters, but Dominion did collect
the materials for years prior to the discharge.286 Accordingly, even though the
pollutants traveled to navigable waters via rainwater and groundwater, a court
following the holding in Umatilla Waterquality Protective Association would
find that Dominion’s coal ash ponds were point sources under the CWA.
Moreover, the Woodward v. Goodwin court determined that a manure pit was
covered by the CWA because “ponds have been found to be a point source.”287

280

See id. (quoting Beartooth All. v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (D. Mont. 1995)).
See id. (citing Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)).
282
See id. (“The valley fill toe is a ‘discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,’ whereby water
percolates and is discharged into the unnamed tributary of Laurel Fork.” (citations omitted)).
283
962 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (D. Or. 1997).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2018).
287
No. C 99–1103 MJJ, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7642, at *31 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000).
281
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In Woodward, the defendant maintained a manure pit which discharged
pollutants on to the plaintiff’s property, and the court held that “unintended runoff erosion” was actionable as a point source.288 This decision strengthens the
claim that a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA because the discharge
of pollutants to surface waters in Woodward was not “a function of” the pond,
but instead, it was “the result of a natural process.”
The Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the precedent that would have brought
coal ash ponds within the regulatory reach of the CWA, and as a result, it has
increased the likelihood of an environmental disaster involving coal ash ponds.
As evidenced above, the Fourth Circuit has been the only court to hold that a
container itself must be functioning “as a conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters” to be considered a point source under the CWA.289 Several
courts have, however, found containers to be point sources when (1) the polluter
initially collected and stored the pollutants in the container, (2) the container
failed due to “flaws” in its “construction,” and (3) the container conveyed
pollutants to navigable waters via a natural process, like the flow of rainwater
and groundwater.290 Thus, an accurate interpretation of the precedent indicates
that Dominion’s coal ash ponds are point sources under the CWA because
Dominion stored coal ash in the ponds, Dominion failed to place a liner in the
ponds, and the unlined ponds conveyed pollutants to navigable waters via
hydrologically connected groundwater.291 Moving forward, the Supreme Court
should follow the precedent and move away from the language in Sierra Club.
B. The Conduit Theory and Coal Ash Ponds
This Section argues that the language and purpose of the CWA, along with
recent decisions from the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, support the
“conduit theory” as a viable mechanism to regulate an unpermitted discharge of
pollutants to surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater. In turn,
288
Woodward, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7642, at *31 (citing Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n. v. Arcuri,
862 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Furthermore, the type of untended run-off erosion from the Thomsen manure
pit is cognizable as a point source.”) (asserting that surface runoff erosion from a river bank was actionable as a
point source).
289
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Plaintiff-Appellee’s
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at 8.
290
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 43, 45–46 (5th Cir. 1980) (determining that
liability was possible when miners placed pollutants in basins and piles and these pollutants were carried away
by rainwater); United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating liability is possible
where a system of fluids in tubes and other apparatus failed to contain chemicals when melting snow caused
overflow).
291
See Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 756 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 903 F.3d 403 (2018).
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it will show that the Court can utilize a variety of arguments and analytical tools
to overturn the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tennessee Clean Water Network. Like
the court in Sierra Club, the Tennessee Clean Water Network court has increased
the likelihood of an environmental disaster involving coal ash ponds because its
decision placed coal ash ponds outside the reach of the CWA. Therefore, this
Section argues that the CWA can be used to regulate unpermitted discharges of
coal ash that travel to surface waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.
A CWA violation consists of five elements: “(1) a pollutant must be (2)
added (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source.”292 When deciding
whether the CWA reaches an unpermitted addition of pollutants to navigable
waters via hydrologically connected groundwater, the Supreme Court must
analyze and follow the plain language of the CWA’s term “discharge of a
pollutant,” which means “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source.”293 In Tennessee Clean Water Network, the Sixth Circuit
analyzed this language, and it determined that an unpermitted discharge does not
fall under the CWA’s coverage unless the point source “dump[s]” pollutants
“directly into … navigable waters.”294 More specifically, the Sixth Circuit
determined that “for pollution to qualify as a ‘discharge of a pollutant’: (1) the
pollutant must make its way to navigable water (2) by virtue of a point-source
conveyance.”295 However, this interpretation of the term “discharge of a
pollutant” contradicts the plain language of the CWA,296 and it conflicts with the
recent circuit court decisions in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui and
Upstate Forever.297
According to the plain language of the CWA, a discharge falls within the
scope of the CWA if the discharge comes “from” a “point source,” and this
language supports the “conduit theory.”298 Nevertheless, the Tennessee Clean
Water Network court inserted the word “directly” into the CWA’s definition of
the term “discharge of a pollutant,” and as a result, coal ash ponds within the

292
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 655 (4th Cir. 2018), petition
for cert. filed, 87 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268).
293
See, e.g., Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2018), petition
for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307); Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 647.
294
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444.
295
Id. at 444 (quoting Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Util. Co., 905 F.3d 925, 934 (2018)).
296
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
297
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650; Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 881 F.3d 754, 765 (9th Cir.
2018), amended and superseded by 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (U.S. Feb. 19,
2019) (No. 18-260).
298
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2012)) (“The plain language of
the CWA requires only that a discharge come ‘from’ a ‘point source.’”).
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Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction must discharge pollutants “directly” to navigable
waters to be subject to CWA regulation.299 To justify its holding, the Tennessee
Clean Water Network court explained that “when the pollutants are discharged
to the river, they are not coming from a point source; they are coming from
groundwater which is a nonpoint-source conveyance.”300 The Sixth Circuit’s
holding, however, does not follow the plain language of the CWA because “[t]he
word ‘from’ indicates ‘a starting point: as [] a point or place where an actual
physical movement … has its beginning.’”301 Accordingly, a point source does
not need to discharge the pollutants “directly” to navigable waters as the Sixth
Circuit indicated, but rather, the CWA only requires that the point source serves
as the “starting point or cause of a discharge.”302
While following a similar line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Act is only concerned with whether the pollutants “come ‘from’” a point
source,303 and if that requirement is satisfied, “[g]ravity flow, resulting in a
discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part of a point source discharge
....”304 Thus, contrary to the holding in Tennessee Clean Water Network, the
more accurate interpretation of the CWA’s language is that gravity flow, which
moves groundwater through pollutants to nearby navigable waters, can “be part
of a ... discharge” under the CWA if a “point source” served as the “starting
point” for the discharge.305 To hold otherwise would contradict the express
language and purpose of the CWA because it would require “pollutants be
channelized not once but twice before the EPA can regulate them.”306 Moreover,
when a point source “indirect[ly]” discharges pollutants to navigable waters, a
299
But see, e.g., id. (stating that discharge to a navigable body of water may be indirect); Haw. Wildlife
Fund, 881 F.3d at 765 (same).
300
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ky.
Waterways, F.3d at 934), petition for cert. filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
301
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 913 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 2002)).
302
See id. (“Under this plain meaning, a point source is the starting point or cause of a discharge under the
CWA, but that starting point need not also convey the discharge directly to navigable waters.”).
303
See Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 762 (“Furthermore, when we stated the ‘pollution [must] reach[ ]
the water through a confined, discrete conveyance,’ we were merely stating the pollution must come ‘from a
discernible conveyance’ as opposed to some ‘[un]identifiable point of discharge.’” (quoting Trs. for Alaska v.
EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984))).
304
Id. at 763 (quoting Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980)).
305
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (“Under this plain meaning, a point source is the starting point
or cause of a discharge under the CWA, but that starting point need not also convey the discharge directly to
navigable waters.”); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 763 (stating that gravity flow may be part of the point
source, and the fact that “groundwater plays a role in delivering the pollutants … to the navigable water does
not preclude liability under the statute”).
306
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (quoting Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 510–11 (2d
Cir. 2005)).
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“delay between the time at which pollution leaves the point source and the time
at which it is added to navigable waters” is inevitable.307 The relevant language
in the CWA, however, “does not place temporal conditions on the discharge of
a pollutant from a point source,” which means that discharges involving “such a
delay,” like discharges from coal ash ponds, can be regulated under the CWA.308
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos provides support for the
conduit theory: Scalia determined that “the CWA does not forbid the addition of
any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source, but rather the
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.”309 Both the Upstate Forever court
and the Hawai’i Wildlife Fund court cited the language from Rapanos in support
of the conduit theory,310 but the Tennessee Clean Water Network court
determined that Scalia never contemplated the “point-source-to-nonpoint-source
dumping” that is involved in the conduit theory.311 To further its point, the
Tennessee Clean Water Network court explained that when Scalia pointed out
that the word “directly” was missing from the CWA’s term “discharge of a
pollutant,” he was aiming “to explain that pollutants which travel through
multiple point sources before discharging into navigable waters are still covered
by the CWA.”312 However, this interpretation of Rapanos is incorrect, as Scalia,
in support of his opinion, indicated that “from the time of the CWA’s enactment,
lower courts have held that the discharge into intermittent channels of any
pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates” the CWA “even if
the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered
waters ….”313 More specifically, the Tennessee Clean Water Network court’s
holding is inconsistent with Rapanos because a pollutant “that naturally washes
downstream” is not necessarily “traveling through multiple point sources.”
Bearing in mind that the “plain language of [the CWA] should be enforced
according to its terms,”314 the Supreme Court should hold that the CWA covers
unpermitted discharges of pollutants that travel to navigable waters via

307

Id. at 648.
Id.
309
Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 764 (internal quotations omitted).
310
See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649–50 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–38
(2006)) (relying on the plurality opinion in Rapanos to support enforcement against indirect transfer of
pollutants); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 764 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743) (same).
311
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 445 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert.
filed, 2019 WL 1620581 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307).
312
Id.
313
Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 764 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743).
314
Id. at 765 (quoting ASARCO, LLC v. Celanese Chem. Co., 792 F.3d 1203, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015)); see
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650.
308
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hydrologically connected groundwater. While it may be argued that the conduit
theory will expand the Act’s reach, such an expansion is warranted because “the
CWA’s prohibition of ‘any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters’” is
“strong evidence of the law’s wide sweep.”315 Furthermore, there are limits
placed on the CWA’s coverage under the conduit theory as the plaintiff must
“allege a direct hydrological connection between groundwater and navigable
waters in order to state a claim under the CWA for a discharge … that passes
through groundwater.”316 Considering that both district courts in Sierra Club and
Tennessee Clean Water Network concluded that a direct hydrological connection
existed between the groundwater under the coal ash ponds and nearby navigable
waters,317 the Supreme Court must hold that the defendants in both cases
violated the CWA by discharging pollutants from the coal ash ponds to
navigable waters via hydrologically connected groundwater.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION IN SIERRA CLUB: IMPLICATIONS
A. The Court’s Decision in Sierra Club Will Have an Impact on Other Cases
Involving “Containers”
In the future, lower courts may interpret the decision in Sierra Club broadly
and apply it to cases involving other types of containers that discharge pollutants
to navigable waters via a “natural process.” Thus, this Section argues that the
repercussions of the court’s decision in Sierra Club will extend outside the realm
of cases involving coal ash ponds, and in turn, it will show that cases involving
unpermitted discharges from other types of containers may fall outside the reach
of the CWA. In reaching this determination, it will highlight the relevant
language from Sierra Club that is applicable to other types of containers, and it
will demonstrate how that language may apply to cases involving containers.
Overall, this Section argues that the Sierra Club court’s holding has increased
the risk of an environmental disaster because future plaintiffs will be unable to
hold polluters liable for discharges from coal ash ponds and other types of

315
Haw. Wildlife Fund, 881 F.3d at 764 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787, 800–06 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
316
Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 651.
317
See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 441 (determining that the expert testimony regarding the
terrain underneath the ponds and the pollutant concentrations in the river was sufficient to establish that the
ponds were leaching coal ash into groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Cumberland River); Sierra
Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that the district court’s conclusion on
the issue was correct because the facts in the case were enough to establish a direct hydrological connection
between the groundwater and surface near the site).
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containers, including, but not limited to, underground storage tanks, waste
ponds, man-made settling basins, and coal mine impoundments.
The CWA explicitly states that the term “point source” was meant to capture
facilities that act as “container[s].”318 In Sierra Club, the Fourth Circuit indicated
that “[r]egardless of whether a source is a pond or some other type of container,
the source must still be functioning as a conveyance of the pollutant into
navigable waters to qualify as a point source.”319 To further its point, the Sierra
Club court held that a point source is present only when the “movement of
pollutants” is “a function of the” container itself “rather [than] the result of a
natural process.”320 On the other hand, several district courts and circuit courts
have determined that the CWA encompasses facilities that act as “containers,”
and several of the facilities in those cases would not satisfy the test used by the
Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club to determine whether a facility is a point source.321
Thus, it is evident that if the Sierra Club court’s decision is applied to any type
of “container” in the future, there is a significant risk that the facility will go
unregulated under the CWA and continue to discharge pollutants to navigable
waters.
The potential impact of Sierra Club becomes more apparent when the court’s
reasoning is applied to previous cases involving “containers” that discharged
pollutants to navigable waters via a “natural process.” For instance, in Earth
Sciences, Inc., the discharge of sodium cyanide to navigable waters was not “a
function of”322 Earth Sciences’ pool, but instead, it was the result of penetration
by “excess rainfall” and “snowmelt.”323 Thus, the reserve sump in Earth
Sciences, Inc. would not satisfy the Sierra Club court’s point source test, and if
a similar facility were before a lower court in the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction,
the court would be forced to allow the defendant to continue discharging sodium
cyanide into the nation’s waters. Moreover, in Abston Construction Co., the
sediment basins discharged pollutants to navigable waters via rainwater runoff,

318

33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012).
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412 (emphasis added).
320
See id. (“That movement of pollutants, however, was not a function of the coal ash piles or ponds, but
rather the result of a natural process …”).
321
See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
322
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412.
323
But see United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979) (“When it fails because
of flaws in the construction or inadequate size to handle the fluids utilized, with resulting discharge, whether
from a fissure in the dirt berm or overflow of a wall, the escape of liquid from the confined system is from a
point source. Although the source of the excess liquid is rainfall or snow melt, this is not the kind of general
runoff considered to be from nonpoint sources under the FWPCA.”).
319
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which constitutes a “natural process.”324 If a lower court within the Fourth
Circuit’s jurisdiction considered whether comparable man-made sediment
basins were point sources under the CWA, the lower court would likely find that
the sediment basins were nonpoint sources because the discharge resulted from
a “natural process.”325 Similarly, if the precedent from Sierra Club were applied
to Woodward, the manure pits in Woodward would be excluded from the CWA’s
coverage because the discharge of pollutants to surface waters in Woodward was
not a function of the pits, but instead was the result of a natural process. 326
Finally, if the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Sierra Club is applied liberally by
lower courts, it could even alter the decision in a case like United States v. Lucas.
In Lucas, the Fifth Circuit determined that the underground septic systems
installed by the defendants were appropriately categorized as “containers,” and
as a result, the court established that they were point sources under the CWA.327
The defendant in Lucas constructed septic systems that eventually failed and
discharged pollutants to wetlands and related hydrological environments, and it
was determined that their behavior violated the CWA.328 While the Fifth Circuit
determined that the “container” in Lucas was a point source, courts following
the precedent from Sierra Club may arrive at a different conclusion as the
defendant did not “create[]” the septic system to “convey anything” into the
navigable waters.329
When the Sierra Club point source test is applied to other cases involving
facilities that could be classified as “containers,” it is evident that the
repercussions of the court’s decision in Sierra Club will extend outside of cases
in which there is an unpermitted discharge from a coal ash pond, and it will have
a negative impact on cases involving discharges from other types of
“containers.” Not only has the Fourth Circuit failed to provide adequate

324
See Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 43–44 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Instead, any water and
other materials that were deposited in Daniel Creek were carried by natural forces, mostly erosion caused by
rainwater runoff.”).
325
See Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 412 (“That movement of pollutants, however, was not a
function of the coal ash piles or ponds, but rather the result of a natural process of ‘precipitation percolat[ing]
through the soil to the groundwater.’”)
326
See Woodward v. Goodwin, No. C 99–1103 MJJ, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7642, at *31 (N.D. Cal. May
12, 2000) (citing Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n. v. Arcuri, 862 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Furthermore,
the type of untended run-off erosion from the Thomsen manure pit is cognizable as a point source.”) (asserting
that surface runoff erosion from a river bank was actionable as a point source)).
327
United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 332 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The septic systems on BHA are
‘containers,’ thus suggesting that they fall under the definition of ‘point source’ ….”).
328
See id. at 322, 351 (“Defendants sold house lots and designed and certified septic systems on wetlands
but represented the lots as dry. Septic systems on the lots failed, causing waste discharges.”).
329
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d at 411.
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protection to the nation’s waters in the context of coal ash ponds, but it has
interpreted the point source definition so narrowly that polluters will be able to
avoid CWA liability simply by constructing a defective “container” that allows
rainwater and groundwater to flow through it and carry pollutants to surface
waters. As a result, the court’s decision in Sierra Club will further increase the
likelihood of an environmental disaster that could harm human health and the
environment. This outcome hardly seems to be in line with the purpose and
language of the CWA.
CONCLUSION
A majority of coal ash ponds across the country remain unlined and pose a
significant threat to the environment and human health.330 Just last year, several
major utilities, including Dominion, admitted that sixty-seven coal ash ponds
across twenty-two states were leaking toxic levels of pollutants into the
groundwater.331 Even though the spill in Kingston resulted in at least thirty
deaths and destroyed over eighty acres of aquatic ecosystems,332 federal
regulatory authorities have failed to solve the coal ash problem and utilities
continue to discharge pollutants into the groundwater. Moreover, the problem
will continue into the future, and catastrophic environmental disasters are likely
to occur unless Congress and the judicial system provide adequate protection to
the nation’s waters. The Sierra Club court, however, has only exacerbated the
problem as its decision removes coal ash ponds from the CWA’s reach and
allows utilities to discharge pollutants to navigable waters via hydrologically
connected groundwater.
Unfortunately, the problem does not end there. The Fourth Circuit’s decision
also removed “other types of containers” that experience groundwater and
rainwater penetration from the CWA’s coverage, and now, the nation’s waters
are even more susceptible to pollution. Overall, the decision in Sierra Club has
created a safe haven for polluters because they can escape liability under the
330

See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
Catherine Morehouse, As 67 Coal Plants in 22 States Report Coal Ash Violations, Greens Fear
Prolonged Cleanup, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/as–67–coal–plants–in–22–
states–report–coal–ash–violations–greens–fear–prol/544843; Utilities Admit Coal Plants in 22 States Are
Violating Federal and State Pollution Standards by Leaking Toxic Chemicals Into Groundwater, EARTHJUSTICE
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2018/utilities–admit–coal–plants–in–22–states–are–
violating–federal–and–state–pollution–standards–by–leaking–toxic–chemicals–into–groundwater.
332
Utilities Admit Coal Plants in 22 States Are Violating Federal and State Pollution Standards by
Leaking Toxic Chemicals Into Groundwater, EARTHJUSTICE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/
2018/utilities–admit–coal–plants–in–22–states–are–violating–federal–and–state–pollution–standards–by–
leaking–toxic–chemicals–into–groundwater.
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CWA by storing pollutants in flawed containers that allow groundwater and
rainwater to carry the pollutants to navigable waters. In order to remedy this
problem and provide adequate protection to the nation’s waters, the Supreme
Court must hold that a coal ash pond is a point source under the CWA. To find
support for this conclusion, the Supreme Court must analyze (1) the language of
the CWA, (2) the purpose of the CWA, and (3) the relevant case law involving
“containers.” Additionally, the Supreme Court should follow the Fourth Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit and establish that the conduit theory provides a viable
mechanism to regulate unpermitted discharges of pollutants to navigable waters
via hydrologically connected groundwater.
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